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Comment Jeﬀrey Liebman
Notional deﬁned contribution (NDC) systems are the latest fad in social
security retirement system design, having been adopted in the past decade
in Sweden, Italy, Poland, Latvia, and Mongolia. Additional countries are
looking seriously at the NDC model. For example, there is currently a de-
bate raging in China about the future of its social security system.
The Chinese pension law on the books says that China is implementing
a funded deﬁned contribution (DC) personal retirement account (PRA)
system. Unfortunately, local governments responsible for collecting the
revenues for the personal accounts have been diverting the funds to other
uses—resulting in what is known as the “empty accounts” problem. Some
western experts have been arguing that China should follow through with
the setting up of funded accounts—that the establishment of clear prop-
erty rights to the accounts will minimize the chance that local governments
continue to misappropriate the funds (Feldstein and Liebman 2006). Other
experts have argued that China should adopt an NDC system (Ahser et al.
2005)—an approach that would result in the accounts remaining perma-
nently empty.
The fundamental features of an NDC system are that it is pay-as-you-go
and that there is a transparent relationship between contributions and fu-
ture beneﬁts, with beneﬁts deﬁned by the accumulation of past payroll tax
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of Economic Researchcontributions at a given interest rate and with no redistribution from high
earners to low earners. Indeed, assuming that the annuitization factors do
not vary with the size of accumulated balances, such systems are actually
regressive because high-balance individuals will, on average, live longer
and receive payouts for more years, a perverse sort of redistribution that is
oﬀset in the U.S.-style deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) system by a progressive beneﬁt
structure.
The two potential advantages of the NDC approach relative to a tradi-
tional DB system result directly from the transparent link between contri-
butions and beneﬁts. First, there will be fewer labor supply disincentives.
Part of the reduction in labor supply disincentives comes from the lack of
redistribution from lifetime higher earners to lifetime lower earners in an
NDC system. This component reﬂects a standard equity-eﬃciency trade-
oﬀ and may or may not be desirable depending on one’s tastes for redistri-
bution. But another part comes from increasing workers’ awareness of the
marginal retirement beneﬁts they earn per hour of work. If the complex
beneﬁt formulas of traditional DB systems cause workers to ignore the in-
cremental beneﬁts per hour of work and to instead perceive the Social Se-
curity payroll tax as a pure tax, then switching to an NDC system could im-
prove labor supply incentives (a switch from a traditional DB system to a
PRA system also has the potential to produce this improvement in labor
supply incentives. See Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ 1987). With this channel,
there is no oﬀsetting loss of redistribution. Moreover, an NDC system
avoids the kinds of retirement incentives that the Goda, Shoven, and
Slavov paper (chapter 1 in this volume) documents.
The second potential beneﬁt of the transparent link between contribu-
tions and payments is that it gives governments a way to resist pensioner
demands for beneﬁt increases. With an NDC system, the government can
simply explain that people’s beneﬁts are what they deserve based upon
their contributions. This consideration is said to have motivated Italy’s
adoption of the NDC approach.
What struck me as I read this excellent chapter by Auerbach and Lee is
how far behind research on NDC systems is compared with research on
PRA and traditional DB systems. While there has been some notable NDC
research (Holtzmann and Palmer 2006; Valdes-Prieto 2000), countries
such as Sweden have erred in designing some of the details of their NDC
systems quite simply because the type of analysis done in this chapter was
not available at the time the design choices were made.
That said, this chapter is not really about NDC systems at all. It is about
the much broader topic of how one designs automatic stabilizers in pay-as-
you-go social security systems, whether they are NDC systems or DB sys-
tems. The presence of an automatic stabilizer is not a fundamental feature
of an NDC system.
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tem that cause beneﬁt levels to depend on realized economic and demo-
graphic conditions, thereby helping to keep the system in balance:
1. The rate at which tax payments are accumulated forward to deter-
mine a worker’s notional account balance at retirement. In the Swedish
system, this rate is based upon the growth rate of average wages.
2. The annuity factor for converting notional account balances to re-
tirement income, a factor that is adjusted in the Swedish system based on
contemporaneous mortality probabilities.
3. Postretirement adjustments to retirement beneﬁt levels that occur
based on the growth rate of average wages.
4. A braking mechanism that reduces beneﬁts if the system’s assets be-
come too low relative to its liabilities.
Studying the stability of such a system requires a stochastic simulation
model that incorporates both demographic (mortality and fertility) and
economic (productivity growth and interest rate) factors and that is linked
to a cohort-by-cohort model of social security ﬁnances. The authors are
uniquely qualiﬁed to develop such a model. What they ﬁnd when they do
so is that the Swedish NDC system is not as stable as one might like, with
the system accumulating large balances in a signiﬁcant fraction of simula-
tion runs and with later cohorts receiving higher rates of return than ear-
lier ones. Auerbach and Lee show, however, that with two fairly simple
modiﬁcations, the system can be made much more stable. First, Sweden ac-
cumulates contributions at the wage growth rate, but the authors show that
NDC system are more stable if they accumulate beneﬁts based on the sum
of wage and population growth. The intuition behind this result is that it is
the total earnings base, not just the average wage, that determines the level
of beneﬁts that can be supported with a given tax rate. Second, the braking
mechanism in the Swedish system is an asymmetric one. Beneﬁts are ad-
justed downward if the system becomes underfunded, but they are not in-
creased when the system starts to accumulate assets. Auerbach and Lee
show that a symmetric brake, applied continuously, leads to much greater
stability. Because these modiﬁcations are straightforward to implement, it
seems likely that the analysis in this chapter will lead rather quickly to im-
proved system design by future adopters of NDC systems.
The payoﬀs to this research need not be limited to NDC systems. A sim-
ilar set of stabilizers could be applied to the U.S. DB system, achieving the
stability beneﬁts illustrated in the Auerbach-Lee analysis without sacriﬁc-
ing the redistributive nature of the U.S. beneﬁt formula:
1. The United States already implicitly accumulates contributions at the
wage growth rate via the wage-indexing provisions of the average indexed
monthly earnings (AIME) calculation.
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amount (PIA) formula include a multiplier to adjust annually for changes
in longevity.
3. Similarly, postretirement beneﬁt levels could be adjusted based not
only on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) but also on wage and population
growth rates.
4. A braking mechanism could be introduced in the United States.
I, therefore, suggest that the authors write a follow-up paper that simu-
lates the eﬀects of applying automatic stabilizers to the current U.S. sys-
tem. Doing so would illustrate that it is possible to obtain the beneﬁts of
stabilization, while preserving redistribution based upon lifetime income.
I would also suggest that the authors extend their analysis to include sim-
ulations in which the stabilization features work via adjustments to payroll
tax rates, rather than solely via changes in beneﬁt levels. It seems unlikely
to be optimal to have all stabilization occur only on the beneﬁt side.
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